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At one level, the Commission's acquisition of new management responsibilities can be explained by standard European integration theory as a 'spillover' effect of an expanding supranational policy role (Haas, 1968 , Lindberg, 1963 . At another level, it has been identified as part of the broader 'audit explosion' (Méndez and Bachtler, 2011) , delineated in Power's work (Power 1997) , or of New Public Management (NPM) reforms in the OECD generally (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004 , Levy, 2002 , Kassim 2004 , Ellinas and Suleiman, 2008 . While neo-functionalist integration theory posits an apolitical technical teleology beneath human agency with a Weberian rationale for the resulting organisational form, NPM
gives an alternative vision of the spread of 'private sector' forms, norms and values, through an almost 'social movement'-like international trend springing from concerns about government 'performance' and high levels of spending (Hood, 1991, Dunleavy and Hood, 1994 ).
These approaches offer some valuable general insights, but are not designed to bring a sufficiently fine grained understanding of the specific management forms developed and implemented for particular programmes, the sequencing of these reforms, or the social mechanisms underlying human agency in these processes. Thus, neo-functionalist predictions of centralised bureaucratic outcomes resulting from incremental policy change in the EU are contradicted, for example, by the simultaneous fragmentation and centralisation of management structures precipitated by the organisational crisis in the Commission in 1999 (Levy, 2006) . Suggesting entirely different outcomes, the NPM framework has been 5 developed in the context of the adaptation of pre-existing large scale governmental organisations 'reinventing' and often 'downsizing' themselves (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) . This is useful in understanding the rhetoric of Commission reform, but the latter has taken place in the context of a rapidly expanding portfolio rather than a stable or shrinking one.
Case, theory and methods
The present study instead takes a different, more complex route, one largely neglected hitherto by scholars of EU management. It builds on a case study-based public management policy making literature (Barzelay 2003 , Barzelay and Feuchtner 2003 , Gaetani 2003 , Barzelay and Jacobsen 2009 , Corbett 2010 , Barzelay and Gallego 2010 , Levy et al., 2011 , which combines a narrative research style (Ragin 1987 , Becker 1997 enriched by ethnography (Berger and Luckman 1966 , Goffman 1959 , Weick 1993 , Vaughan 2009 ), with event-centric, mechanism-based explanations from classical policy cycle analysis (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973 , Kingdon, 1984 , Baumgartner and Jones, 1993 and organisation science (Cyert and March 1963 , Allison 1971 , Levitt and March 1988 , and the analytical sociology of collective action (Smelser, 1962 , Hedström and Swedberg 1998 , McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001 , Abbott 2001 , Hedstrom and Bearman 2009 . The result of this combination is a dense organisation-focussed case narrative, structured around the policy cycle processes and human agency delineated respectively in the policy cycle and collective action literatures.
As this case focuses on shifts in the direction of policy within a discrete organisational setting, the Baumgartner and Jones (1993) partial equilibrium model of policy sub-systems is particularly useful. A sub-system is an institutional structure which is responsible for policy 6 making coupled with formal and informal arrangements in defined decision venues (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, p7, Barzelay, 2001, p.59) . When the potential for policy direction change is high, a disequilibrium situation occurs in the sub-system until partial equilibrium and an orderly flow of consistent decisions is restored. Within this event sequence, models of collective action become relevant to explain the motivations of key organisational players, hence the salience of ethnographic research among those groups.
The locus of our earlier research on the Commission's IICF using this frame (Levy et al., 2011) , was primarily at high level policy choice. This case is situated further down the decision chain, specifically at the policy decisions involved in the implementation of financial management reform in the European Social Fund (ESF) by the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DG EMPL)), between 2006 and 2009. In Baumgartner and Jones' terms, the case tracks the interaction of the ESF policy subsystem (including delivery agencies in the Member States), with the internal (the Commission IAS, auditors in the DGs) and external (the Court, the EP COCOBU) control sub-systems.
In brief, DG EMPL along with the Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG REGIO) is responsible with the Member States for the management of the EU's Cohesion Funds, the collective term for economic development measures in disadvantaged regions and among disadvantaged groups in the labour market. These programmes are jointly funded with the Member States in varying proportions over 7year programming periods coinciding with the EU's financial framework, and are implemented on the ground by a variety of Member State agencies, typically local economic development bodies and specially created programme management teams. The aforementioned DGs have an essentially supervisory role, first 7 approving, and then monitoring and auditing the operational programmes in the Member States.
The empirical basis of the study is drawn from two sources. First, EU documentation including ECA annual reports and declarations of assurance (DASs), the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) of DG EMPL and Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG REGIO), and annual reports from the Commission's Internal Audit Service (IAS) and Anti Fraud Office (OLAF)); and second, in-depth fieldwork interviews carried out in the autumn of 2008 with nine DG EMPL decision makers at Head of Unit level and above. The interviews ranged in length from one to two and a half hours, and were designed to elicit the reflections and judgments of those involved in implementing the reform. This achieved two goals: it enabled a more profound understanding of the policy processes and the statements found in the document review, and it created a snapshot of the organisational consciousness of the leadership of the DG. The latter is reported as the section on the dramaturgy in the DG and includes some illustrative quotations of the collective mindset.
The narrative starts with a description of the policy and actor context so as to inform the elite interview ethnography and the subsequent account of the policy responses. Using the Baumgartner and Jones analytical frame, the episode analyses the interaction between the Cohesion Policy, internal control and external control sub-governments, identifying the social mechanisms at work in the decision processes. Within this context, 'control' is used as a generic for the range of financial management controls, 'audit' refers to systems compliance audit, and 'external audit' presumes the practice of random sample transaction testing as used by the ECA in its annual reports and DAS.
The mis en scène
In 2006, all Commission Directorates-General (DGs) had to begin implementing the IICF Action Plan in their areas of responsibility according to a strict timetable (European Commission, 2006) . As joint partner with DG REGIO in the management of the EU's Cohesion Funds, it was the job of DG EMPL to reorganise its own financial management systems and to get the implementing agencies in the Member States to do the same to achieve compliance. Given the model of 'shared management' (Strasser, 1992 , Marks, 1993 , Bache, 1998 , Levy, 2000 between the Commission and the Member States for these programmes, this was both particularly difficult (see below) and necessary, as high error rates above the upper threshold (a 5% level of materiality) adopted by the ECA for its transaction testing methodology, were perennially reported in its Annual Reports and DAS (Méndez and Bachtler, 2011 , Davies et al, 2008 , Levy et al, 2011 . 'expenditure was not free of material irregularities', with some programmes closed (i.e. signed off as completed), 'without a sound basis' (ECA, 2006 pp.12 and 128) . Of the 95 current projects audited, 60 were affected by material errors, including lack of supporting evidence for spending, disregard of procurement and state aid rules, declaration of unpaid advances, ineligible expenditure, misallocation of overheads (ECA, 2006, p.119) . Worse was to come, because as the Court's report was being published in the autumn of 2006, its auditors were finding an error rate of 12% in the transactions it was testing in current structural fund projects (ECA, 2007a) .
In addition to the Court, and à propos the IICF Action Plan, the IAS carried out a major Levy et al. 2011 , Méndez and Bachtler, 2011 , and Davies et al 2008 , and that the 16 actions in the IICF Action Plan had an implementation deadline for the end of 2007 (European Commission, 2006) . While it was challenging enough to reform internal financial circuits in the DGs, it was infinitely more so to persuade agencies in 25 member states to change theirs in the same time frame; but this is what DGs REGIO and EMPL were obliged to do.
The dramaturgy in DG EMPL
As we have argued, an appreciation of the mindset of the decision makers in DG EMPL is fundamental in order to understand the reform episode (Collingwood, 1946, Berger and Luckman, 1966) . During the period of the most intense change , perceptions and responses were focussed at one level on specific events and institutions -the Court, the Parliament, the Member States, the error rate, the use of the payments interruptions system, the AAR. At another level, they expressed more general feelings of hope, resignation, fear, frustration, self-and organisational esteem, lack of control, isolation. To illustrate, we have interpolated this section with anonymised fieldwork interview quotations.
As noted earlier, along with DG REGIO and the Member State delivery agencies, DG EMPL interacted with actors and practices in the external and internal control sub-systems. These were perceived as often difficult relationships over which the DG had limited control.
Respondents expressed feelings of being under incessant scrutiny by the EP and the ECA, and were not always confident that the Commission was giving the 'best picture' to the Court. The EP was seen as taking an increasing interest in controlling the budget, so putting an enormous political pressure on the Commission, in particular over the Cohesion Funds, the only spending area completely 'red coded' by the ECA since the introduction of the so-called traffic lights system in 2004/5: There was a mix of feelings about why this was the case: some saw it as evidence of relatively poor management of the Cohesion Funds compared to other programmes, others took the view that the ECA was exacting a price for being ignored, a situation which could be rectified through building better relationships between the DG and the Court. Such optimism was balanced however, by the view that the Court was inflexible, and working to a different set of standards and methodologies: This perception was symptomatic of more general feelings of alienation and lack of control.
The policy making environment was seen as highly contingent, where decisions took up to 2 or 3 years to finalise with actors holding out until the last minute before reaching agreement.
Despite the best efforts of officials, optimal 'rational' solutions (as they were seen) were bested by those which were politically acceptable to the Member States:
We make the legislative proposals two to three years in advance, and no matter how much effort we put in, and indeed in fairness no matter how much effort the member states put in, you will not get an agreement on that legislation until the night before the money runs out. The increasing use of the stick was underpinned by the view that the pursuit of consensus had not produced the desired results anyway (because of half-hearted implementation at the Member State level), and feelings that the DG's efforts were often misunderstood and that it took an unfair share of the blame for control failures. Thus the 'benefit of the doubt' had shifted from the Member States as the DG toughened its position, much as the ECA (and the IAS) had recommended it do, 'cleaning up' as it went along rather than waiting until sometimes years later in the cycle. The adequacy of Member States' reporting standards and obligations were mostly given short shrift, adding to the climate of low trust. Withholding funds to get the desired improvements and shifting the audit burden onto the Member States (see below), were both vindicating and liberating from the DG's point of view: was the culmination of a deluge of bad news, not a pre-emptive strike.
And you will not get.... an agreement on the legislation until after they've agreed what the next budget is. And of course they won't agree the next budget until the night before the money here runs out, which means you don't get an agreement on the legislation until
Leaving aside the timing of this change, it nevertheless had significant effects on performance (see later) and organisation. On one level, the 'new procedures' represented a change in attitude in the DG as we have argued. To put that into practice required the creation of an audit report database (the A-REP system), and a supporting organisational structure to action the outputs from the database. The A-REP database contains the audit findings and recommendations of the ECA and of DG EMPL auditors on member state OPs, and links these directly to Member State action plans, payment interruptions, suspensions and financial corrections. For each audit finding or control recommendation, all follow-up actions undertaken by DG EMPL (from initial letters up to ultimate financial corrections) are registered in the A-REP system. Once recorded, a negative audit report would automatically come to the attention of the Geographical unit (Geodesk) responsible for the OP. The standard procedure was for the relevant Geodesk (there are 8 grouped on a multi country basis), to inform the management authority in the Member State of the audit findings, setting the stage for discussions that would normally lead, first, to agreement on an action plan and, then, to an assessment of the action plan's implementation. It also strengthened the role of the recently created Directorate for Audit and Controls in DG EMPL, copied from DG REGIO practice (Méndez and Bachtler, 2011 p.752) , 'encouraged' by the IAS, and an iteration of the 'internal audit capability' (IAC) ushered in by the Kinnock-Prodi reforms. In establishing this Directorate, the programme evaluation function was transferred to a newly created staff office reporting directly to the apex of DG EMPL so separating programme evaluation organisationally from the audit services in order to prepare for the increase in audit staff. As a result, the number of audits performed by DG EMPL Not satisfied with the effects of the IICF action plan on the management of the structural funds, the EP asked and the Commission promised (Kallas, 2007) have already occurred, audit and control arrangements are deemed to be weak, or utilisation rates (i.e. take-up) are low), to ensure more rapid follow-up on the results of audits, and to proceed more quickly to suspension of payments and recoveries.
One of the difficulties we identified is that Auditors and Geo Desks don't work well together systematically and there was no way of knowing where this was happening and where it was not. System was merely formalising what was in the procedures
As in the case of the IICF Action Plan, the cohesion/structural funds Action Plan specified outputs and indicators, together with deadlines so that its implementation could be monitored, in this instance by the EP on a quarterly basis. The final implementation date was set at 31st were stopped (including payments for 40 programmes interrupted, 34 preventive, warning letters sent to programmes' authorities to prevent them from sending any payment request as long as the identified weaknesses were not corrected and 2 programmes without an approved compliance assessment)'. (European Commission, 2011a, p.23) . This suggests that whilst DG REGIO had latterly adopted an aggressive interruptions policy, it had been slower than DG EMPL in doing so.
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Praise from the IAS can best be described as lukewarm. After examining controls by DGs REGIO and EMPL over the management and control systems the member states had announced for the 2007-13 programming period '(t)he IAS shares the ECA's view that it is too early in the programming period to conclude that the changes to the rules and supervisory systems have succeeded in reducing the number of errors in payments at final beneficiary level' (European Commission, 2010b p.8) . It found that 'although the checks were performed as intended, the process suffered from delays incurred by the Member States' services'; there were 'concerns about the quality of the information provided at Member State level and (it is) recommended that the DGs follow these up in the next stage of the assurance building process'. DGs needed to 'define their own audit strategies more explicitly, in particular the extent to which they take account of the results of Member State audit work'; there was room 'for a more coordinated audit approach between the Commission and Member States, or even for joint audits, particularly when different audits concern the same national audit authorities' This claim should be treated with extreme caution however, as it cannot be even approximately replicated using the transaction testing data published by the Court for any of those years. Indeed, in explaining the new approach upon which these figures were based (essentially drawn from total disbursements rather than on a numbers-of-programmesaffected basis), DG EMPL itself cautioned that '(t)his rate of error is therefore not In terms of the Baumgartner and Jones model, the partial equilibrium pertaining in the structural fund policy sub-system had, under the pressures outlined, transitioned to disequilibrium so allowing a resetting of the policy agenda as the financial management 27 'domain structure' underwent redefinition (Barzelay, 2001, pp.61-2) . From the evidence gathered, the dramaturgy is suggestive of a group of actors which perceived themselves to be misunderstood and virtually friendless, and felt under intense pressure to raise performance.
Conditions of threat had prevailed (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001) in the DG for a number of years, producing a social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman, 1966) within which the mainsprings for action were defined. While this climate of fear and threat was a primary driver for decision makers, the choices made must also be understood in the context of the perceived available solutions. These had to be congruent with the dominant rule-based bureaucratic norms of the Commission and the by now well-established folklore in the EU's institutional community that the Member States were culpable for most of the error (ECA, 2007b) .
From the standpoint of the threat felt within the DG, this was attributed to a number of recurring sources: the ECA's annual DAS, specifically the error rate, the annual discharge drawn up by the COCOBU, some members of the College of Commissioners in particular Commissioner Kallas, and the Commission's own internal services in the form of the IAS and OLAF. Given the subordinate position of DG EMPL within this institutional landscape, the DG had to find a strategy to neutralise the threat without aggravating relationships with those actors, and which drew on the accepted beliefs and 'rules of the game' we have just outlined (Cyert and March, 1963) . This explains the preference for the regulatory approach in general, and the specific targeting of the Member States' compliance obligations and systems, plus the addition of the new 'stick' of payment interruption to beat them with. From a bureaucratic point of view, the 'automation' of the new sanctions regime via the A-REP system was a highly desirable culturally compliant outcome, as it vitiated any potential claims that particular programmes were being arbitrarily targeted by Geodesk officers. In essence however, the effect of the policy shift was to transfer the threat from DG EMPL to the Member State implementing agencies.
At the micro level, the empowerment of middle managers fitted in with the new management paradigm ushered in by the Kinnock-Prodi reforms (Kassim, 2008) . The upgrading of the internal audit capability to full Directorate status, the rise in the level of audit activity and the imposition of more stringent audit reporting, was simply an iteration of the IICF locally, a project pushed and prodded forward by the gatekeeper of the faith, the IAS, itself originating from the ECA's single audit opinion 2/2004. As with other aspects of this public management reform process, these actions were congruent with the consensus across the EU's institutional boundaries. The redefinition of the error rate can be seen as part of a longer term Commission project to get the ECA to report lower rates however, and is thus still an area of contention in this landscape.
Finally, this case study has more general significance as it further enriches the case narrative public management reform literature, in particular showing its salience to more routine, lower level elements of policy making. In the specific area of management reform in the EU institutions, it adds another case to those few using the policy cycle approach, an approach that hitherto has been largely confined to the analysis of EU 'high politics'. It also makes a new contribution to the neglected field of EU financial management reform, a dark continent for academic research for far too long. It is hoped that this case will inspire others to shed more critical and analytical light in this area. 
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